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Does God Have a Body?
Rāmānuja’s Challenge to the Christian Tradition
Jon Paul Sydnor
Emmanuel College, Boston
ABSTRACT: The Christian tradition’s core
theological assertion is the embodiment of
God in the person of Jesus Christ. Yet, even
while asserting God’s incarnation in space and
time, the tradition has usually denied
embodiment unto the Godhead itself.
Theologians have based this denial on Jewish
iconoclasm, Greek idealism, and inferences
from God’s omnipresence, transcendence, and
infinity. This speculative essay will argue that
Hindu Śrīvaiṣṇava theologian Rāmānuja
successfully addresses these concerns. He
argues for the embodiment of an omnipresent,
transcendent, and infinite personal God.
Rāmānuja largely derives his arguments from
the Hindu scriptures. Nevertheless, their
rational explication and internal coherence
render divine embodiment a legitimate
theological option for the Christian tradition,
whose
scriptures
present
both
anthropomorphic and iconoclastic concepts of
God. Since Godhead embodiment is
ontologically coherent and rationally
defensible, Christians must accept or reject it
based on axiological grounds, by evaluating
the felt consequences of the doctrine in

Christian life. For embodied beings, any
pastoral
theology
should
commend
embodiment within the Godhead.
Hinduism, Christianity, and Godhead
Embodiment: Continuing a liberal Christian
trajectory toward divine embodiment.
The Christian tradition presumes divine
embodiment, founded as it is on the
expression of the divine Logos in Jesus Christ
(John 1). At the same time, the tradition has
usually denied the possibility of Godhead
embodiment—the assertion that God in
Godself possesses a body. This essay will
tentatively, provisionally, and speculatively
assert divine embodiment within the Godhead
itself. Since creation is an expression of the
overflowing love of God, our created condition
must be a blessing. Hence, our material
existence cannot be inferior to any purely
spiritual existence, nor need we subordinate
body to soul.
Biblically, Genesis 1.24-27 defines
humankind as made in the image of God. The
Christian tradition has interpreted this text in
many different ways. Athanasius defines the
image of God as, at least in part, our ability to
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reason.1 Augustine, basing his interpretation
of the image of God on the Trinity, notes that
psychologically we are three making a whole—
memory, intellect, and will co-operating
within one person.2 More sympathetic to our
agenda, Irenaeus insists that the image of God
includes every part of a human—soul, spirit,
and body. Hence, to invoke the divine image is
to integrate all three aspects of our person
into one experiential unity.3 Like Irenaeus, we
are now attempting to define the image of God
in this-worldly, embodied terms. Defined thus,
creation in the image of God invites us to
celebrate our condition as personal, local, and
sentient beings. Indeed, creation in the image
of God allows us to imagine God in Godself as
embodied—personal, local, and sentient—
although limitless with regard to this
universe.
This consideration of divine embodiment
continues the trajectory of liberal Christian
theology which, over the past several decades,
has adopted reforms that celebrate the human
condition. For example, most authoritative
Christian theologians, such as St. Thomas
Aquinas, deem God to be impassible: without
passions, free of appetites, and incapable of
sensation.4 However, many theologians of
late—feminist, womanist, process, open, et
al—have reconsidered the doctrine of
impassibility, describing it as both unbiblical
and patriarchal. As unbiblical, the doctrine
ignores numerous biblical texts in which God
is interactive, emotional, even conversational
(Exodus 33:11). The Bible ascribes qualities to
God that imply passability such as compassion
(Exodus 22:27). God even changes the divine
mind, when presented with a convincing
argument (Numbers 14:13-25, Amos 7:3, 6).5 As
patriarchal, the doctrine of divine
impassibility suggests a stoical male ideal who
is personally distant and emotionally
unavailable. Impassibility celebrates the
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rugged, lone maverick who thrives outside of
community,
who
is
nonexpressive,
unemotional, and antisocial. He needs no one.6
In response to this diagnosis, certain
theologians, such as Thomas J. Oord, have
instead argued for the passibility of God—that
God feels, and feels deeply. God is sympathetic
to human events, responsive to human cries,
and personally active in human affairs. God is
highly involved, as a full person—thinking,
feeling, talking, and changing.7 This passible
concept of God implies rejecting another
traditionally ascribed quality of God, that of
immutability. This doctrine asserts that God,
being perfect, cannot change. The universe
cannot affect this perfectly actual God, who
transcends the vicissitudes of creatures within
creation.8 However, as noted above, the
biblical God changes often. Moreover, if God is
a divine person, or a community of divine
persons, and not an abstract ideal, then God
must be receptive to interpersonal influence.
Love demands both openness to reality and
vulnerability to community, so steadfast love
will produce unceasing change.9
The divine mutability suggests, by way of
consequence, the divine temporality. God is
not atemporal, in some timeless, transcendent
state. Instead, God is temporal, participating
in time, open to change to the very core of the
divine being. To clarify: God as the creator and
sustainer of our spacetime cannot be limited
to it—God is not restricted to our temporal
universe, as it were. But God is open to the
succession of feelings, events, and emotions
that relationality affords. God is personal and
relational, which is to be timeful.10
Finally, the doctrine of the social Trinity
has received increased attention over the past
several decades, led by such theologians as
Jurgen Moltmann, Catherine Mowry Lacugna,
John D. Zizioulas, and Leonardo Boff. While the
concept of God as three persons in
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communion has perennial expression within
Christianity, concerns regarding tritheism
caused the tradition to, at times, emphasize
the unity of God over the diversity within God.
The theologians above, on the other hand,
emphasize interpersonality within the
Godhead. In their view, God is three always
becoming one, rather than one with three
different expressions. The multiplicity of God
precedes the unicity of God, not temporally,
but ontologically. Without community,
without increase-through-relation, God would
not be.11
To many Christians, these three
theological reforms—interpreting God as
mutable, temporal, and social—are highly
salutary. They re-articulate the biblical
assertion that we are made in the image of
God—for love, relationship, and community.
And they celebrate the human condition as an
expression of the divine condition. Now, let us
consider how the thought of Rāmānuja might
help us to continue along this liberal Christian
trajectory and consider divine embodiment,
even unto the Godhead. (Please note: what
follows is speculative theology. I believe the
position taken is worth consideration, but I do
not assert that it is true.)
Cosmic embodiment: The universe as the body
of Nārāyaṇa.
Rāmānuja’s theology offers several modes
of divine being. We must distinguish these
modes of divine being in order to understand
how they cohere. To begin, Rāmānuja
proposes a panentheistic, emanationist
account of divine embodiment, in which
Nārāyaṇa supports and controls the universe
of sentient and nonsentient beings. Just as our
self controls and supports our body, Nārāyaṇa
controls and supports the universe as his
body. All souls and bodies, all spirit and
matter, derive their being from Nārāyaṇa, as
distinct modes of Nārāyaṇa’s self-expression.
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Nārāyaṇa unifies them through his sustenance
and diversifies them with real difference.12
They are, simultaneously, one and many.
Such panentheism has parallels within the
Christian tradition, even as Christianity has
usually rejected emanationism. Emanationism
is found suspect on several counts. First, in the
substantialist wording of the traditional
creeds, only Christ is of one substance
(homooúsios) with the Father. In order to
preserve the uniqueness of Christ, the rest of
the universe must be of a different substance
from the Father. Since emanationism implies
the universal sharing of one divine substance,
substantialist
christologies
preclude
13
emanationism.
If the universe must be of a different
substance from the Father and Son, but is not
made of pre-existing, recalcitrant matter (as
in Plato’s Timaeus), then it must have been
created from nothingness. In other words, the
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, or
creation from nothing, results at least
partially from substantialist Christology. The
universe arose by the will of God, but it does
not derive from the very being of God. It
derives from elsewhere, from the nihil, which
God’s gracious will overcomes through
creative speech. So crucial was creatio ex
nihilo to the integrity of Christian thought
that The Fourth Lateran Council declared it
dogma in 1215 (Constitution I), and the First
Vatican Council of 1869-1870 anathematized
all who asserted emanationism (Canon I.3-4).
The liberal Christian theological tradition
within which we are speculating has newly
celebrated vulnerability, participation, and
dynamism as coordinate with love, hence
integral to God. Theologians like Friedrich
Schleiermacher have offered Christologies
based on agapic phenomenology rather than
substantialist
ontology.14
Since
such
Christologies do not hinge on a substantialist
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distinction between the Creator and creation,
we no longer need reject panentheism as
Christologically incoherent. Instead of being
unified in substance with the Creator, Christ
can become the One who is perfectly aware of
the universe’s source in creative, divine love.
Through this awareness, Christ imbues
humanity with the universal, unconditional
love that is its rightful inheritance.15
Some process theologians, such as Charles
Hartshorne, David Ray Griffin, and Marjorie
Suchocki, have objected that classical theism
divides the world (matter) from God (spirit),
rendering the universe profane. As a
correction, they assert the presence of God
within the world through a soul-body analogy
similar to Rāmānuja’s. According to these
theologians, the soul-body analogy allows us
to sense God within the universe, while also
acknowledging that God exceeds the universe.
The concept articulates our experience of God
as both immanent and transcendent. It
ascribes the holiness of the universe to a
source beyond, thereby celebrating the
divinity of all reality, while avoiding
pantheism and championing panentheism.16
Thus, these Christian theologians offer
concepts of the God-world relationship
analogous to Rāmānuja’s. God’s creative,
sustaining power results in cosmic
embodiment. The universe is the body of God,
who includes and exceeds the universe, just as
we include and exceed our own bodies.
Personal embodiment: The beautiful, sensible,
humanlike form of God.
As we have seen, according to Rāmānuja
divinity finds embodiment in the universe.
Rāmānuja’s doctrine of divine embodiment
could certainly inform Christian panentheism.
Indeed, Ankur Barua has magisterially utilized
Rāmānuja to buttress Christian concepts of the
cosmos as the body of God.17 However,
Rāmānuja makes another move that is more
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central to our argument for Godhead
embodiment. In addition to cosmic divine
embodiment, Rāmānuja also advocates
personal divine embodiment. In other words,
Rāmānuja proposes that God possesses a
divine
form
(divyarūpa)—a
sensible,
humanlike, embodied expression of divinity
that is unconditionally ultimate. Crucially, this
divine form is unified with an essential form
(svarūpa)—an
invisible,
omnipresent,
transcendent aspect. In Rāmānuja’s theistic
tradition, the abstract, essential form of God
begs expression in the concrete, personal form
of God, just as the concrete, personal form
finds it saving completion in the abstract,
essential form. Humans need God to be a
person who is somewhere and a presence who
is everywhere, so God fulfills both needs.
Below, I will explicate Rāmānuja’s doctrine of
the divyarūpa (concrete, personal form) of
God as I note how it addresses traditional
Christian objections to Godhead embodiment.
Since most of the Christian sources in this
essay are systematic theologians, for my
explication of Rāmānuja I will primarily rely
on the Vedārthasaṅgraha, his most systematic
work of theology.
A Constructed Hindu-Christian Dialogue
Christian objections to Godhead embodiment.
Christian objections to embodiment
within the Godhead have taken several forms,
which we will review below. Before we begin,
we must note that Rāmānuja cannot address
objections based on Christian scripture. Some
Christians interpret the commandment
against making graven images (Exodus 20:4) as
a declaration of the disembodiment of God.
More compellingly, John 4:24a declares: “God
is Spirit”. Conversely, other passages suggest
the embodiment of God. Genesis 3:8 describes
God as walking in the Garden of Eden. Jacob
claims to have seen God face to face (Genesis
32.30). In Exodus 33:22, God covers Moses’ face
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with the divine hand in order to protect Moses
from seeing God. So, even though Rāmānuja
cannot refute biblical arguments against
Godhead embodiment, these arguments are
not themselves conclusive, since the Bible
offers multiple attitudes toward embodiment.
In order to avoid the quicksand of scriptural
polemics, this essay will present theological
objections to Godhead embodiment, not
scriptural objections. After presenting each
theological objection, I will present
Rāmānuja’s implicit response to it.
Cumulatively, the responses will provide a
serviceable introduction to Rāmānuja’s
doctrine of divine, personal embodiment.
Objection: The embodied God is an
anthropomorphic projection.

If thy predicates are anthropomorphisms,
the
subject
of
them
is
an
anthropomorphism too. If love, goodness,
personality, &c, are human attributes, so
also is the subject which thou
presupposest, the existence of God, the
belief that there is a God, an
anthropomorphism - a presupposition
purely human…Thou believest in love as a
divine attribute because thou thyself
lovest; thou believest that God is a wise,
benevolent being because thou knowest
nothing better in thyself than
benevolence and wisdom; and thou
believest that God exists, and that
therefore he is a subject…because thou
existest, art thyself a subject. (Ludwig
Feuerbach)18

The German philosopher Ludwig
Feuerbach most famously asserted that God is
a projection of the highest human ideals.
Feuerbach himself insisted that he was not an
atheist. Nevertheless, his religious humanism
has occasionally earned him a place among
Paul Ricoeur’s masters of suspicion: Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud. According to Feuerbach,
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predicates constitute a subject. There is no
subject without qualities. Problematically,
humans cannot “think” the divine attributes
as divine attributes. Due to our limited human
epistemological situation, we can only “think”
human attributes, then project them onto
God. Therefore, God can be no more than a
conglomeration of the best human attributes.
Theology is epistemologically limited to
anthropology. Inevitably, to worship God is to
celebrate the best in humankind. Having
ascribed the best of our qualities to God, we
may then infer the existence of God
underlying those qualities. But that is only
because we are familiar with our own
existence, underlying our own (more mixed)
qualities. In the end, the existence of God is
but a projection of our own, very human,
existence.19
Rāmānuja
replies:
God
is
not
anthropomorphic; humans are theomorphic.
Rāmānuja’s concept of God maintains a
profound tension. Rāmānuja defines God’s
svarūpa, the proper form or essence, as
infinite, pure, blissful knowledge. This
definition is abstract and impersonal, in
accord with the early, nontheistic Upaniṣadic
tradition. At the same time, Rāmānuja also
conceptualizes God as possessing a divyarūpa,
or divine form. This divine form has a
beautiful, youthful appearance. He is a person
with a personal name: Nārāyaṇa. This concept
of the divine accords with the highly personal
devotion that characterizes Rāmānuja’s own
Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition.
Worried about theological literalism, the
Semitic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam have traditionally been chary, to varying
degrees, of humanlike depictions or
conceptions of deity. The academic study of
religion has come to categorize such
depictions as “anthropomorphic”. But, from
the perspective of Rāmānuja, the ascription of
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a divine form (divyarūpa) to Nārāyaṇa is not
technically anthropomorphic, since human
knowledge of Nārāyaṇa’s bodily form is
scripturally derived rather than humanly
projected.20 Indeed, Rāmānuja insists on the
reality of the divine form based on the
authority of scripture, particularly the
Brahma Sutras (1.1.21), which claim that
Brahman (a more generalized term for the
ultimate, personal God) dwells within the
Sun.21 Elsewhere, Rāmānuja cites theistic
Upaniṣads that describe Brahman as wearing a
saffron-colored garment,22 having the color of
the sun, and being moon-faced.23 Crucially,
Nārāyaṇa’s humanlike form ontologically (not
chronologically) precedes and grounds human
existence. Therefore, any interpretation of
Nārāyaṇa as anthropomorphic is mistaken.
Nārāyaṇa is not anthropomorphic; humans
are theomorphic.
Objection: Embodiment would diminish
God.

[The most ancient philosophers] all
posited an infinite first principle of things,
as though compelled by truth itself. Yet
they did not recognize their own voice.
They judged the infinity of the first
principle in terms of discrete quantity,
following Democritus, who posited
infinite atoms as the principles of things,
and also Anaxagoras, who posited infinite
similar parts as the principles of things. Or
they judged infinity in terms of
continuous quantity, following those who
posited that the first principle of all things
was some element or a confused infinite
body. But, since it was shown by the effort
of later philosophers that there is no
infinite body, given that there must be a
first principle that is in some way infinite,
we conclude that the infinite which is the
first principle is neither a body nor a
power in a body. (St. Thomas Aquinas)24
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Embodiment suggests finitude. A body is
not infinite, it is finite. A body is not every
body, it is some body, so it becomes one among
many, an object among objects. This status
precludes divinity. God cannot be a supreme
being among beings, because then God would
be exceeded by being itself. By way of
consequence, God must be something more.
God must be, at least, the ground of being that
sustains all beings. For this reason, Christian
theology has generally rejected Godhead
embodiment.25
Rāmānuja replies: Embodiment and infinitude
are compatible; the embodied God remains
transcendent.
Writing for his devotional, theistic
Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition, Rāmānuja seeks to
preserve the majestic transcendence of
Nārāyaṇa. Some religious traditions assert
divine transcendence by adopting apophatic
interpretations of God, denying to God all
humanly knowable attributes, in an attempt to
preserve the wholly other nature of the divine.
Śaṅkara and his later Advaitin followers
utilized this approach, arguing that Brahman
is ultimately nirguṇa, without qualities, but
may be conceptualized as saguṇa, with
qualities, by those less advanced on the path
to enlightenment.26
Rāmānuja, on the other hand,
categorically rejects nirguṇa, apophatic
approaches to understanding God. Yet his
saguṇa, cataphatic approach, which ascribes
real qualities to God, risks rendering the
divine comprehensible or mundane. If we use
language to describe God, and assert that the
language is in some way true, then the infinite
God may become bound within our finite
language. Thus, the transcendence of God
would be lost to the linguistic description of
God. We seem to be caught in a theological
vise: either we can describe God (the
cataphatic approach) and render God finite, or
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we can leave God a contentless mystery (the
apophatic approach) and preserve God’s
infinity.
Rāmānuja navigates this Scylla and
Charybdis of theology through the practice of
transcataphatic theism. That is, he uses
language to describe God, and asserts that his
language reveals something true about God.
But the positive attributes ascribed to God are
themselves infinite, as befitting an infinite
God. Hence, his approach unites divine
transcendence with cataphatic theology—it is
transcataphatic. In other words, Rāmānuja’s
concept of God has positive content yet
exceeds
human
understanding.
Metaphorically, Rāmānuja describes Nārāyaṇa
as an ocean of auspicious qualities, possessing
excellences beyond comprehension. In this
way, Rāmānuja transfers the immensity of the
ocean to the person of Nārāyaṇa, leaving him
as unfathomable as the depths of the sea.27 The
sheer infinity of Nārāyaṇa’s attributes, and
Nārāyaṇa’s capacity to bear this infinity of
attributes, establishes Nārāyaṇa’s eclipse of all
human thought. He is always more than what
we have said, so his being remains within
sublime mystery. By adopting transcataphatic
theism, Rāmānuja preserves the beauty,
personality, and transcendence of the divine,
yet rejects the impersonal transcendence that
characterizes Advaitin apophatic (nirguṇa)
transtheism. Nārāyaṇa is a loving divinity
rather than an indifferent absolute, a
relational personality rather than pure
consciousness.
Objection: Divine embodiment suggests
limited locality rather than unlimited
omnipresence.

On account of His greatness [God] is
ranked as the All, and is the Father of the
universe. Nor are any parts to be
predicated of Him…For the One is
indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite,
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not considered with reference to
inscrutability, but with reference to its
being without dimensions, and not having
a limit. And therefore it is without form
and name. (Clement of Alexandria)28

If an embodied God were everywhere,
then those parts constituting God’s body
would mix with the parts constituting the
universe. God would be divided and jumbled.
In order to avoid this confusion, we could
assert that God is somewhere, not everywhere.
But then God would be limited in space. God
would be there instead of here, or here instead
of there. As sinners, we could hide from God.
As sufferers, we could find ourselves outside
God’s grace. But scripture, tradition, reason,
and experience all attest that God is uniformly
and absolutely present throughout our lives,
both in time and space, undiluted and
undivided. God is perfectly God, everywhere.
Therefore, God cannot be embodied. God must
be spirit—infinite, invisible presence.29
Rāmānuja replies: Embodiment and ubiquity
are reconciled in Nārāyaṇa.
Rāmānuja provides a coherent account of
the embodiment and ubiquity of Nārāyaṇa. In
his doctrine of the ātman (the soul; here, the
personal soul), Rāmānuja asserts that the
ātman is both aṇu (atomic, localizable) and
vibhū (pervasive within the body). Just as a
sandalwood object scents a room with the
fragrance of sandalwood, so an atomic soul
pervades a body with sentience. Similarly, we
can conceptualize Nārāyaṇa as aṇu, localizable
within his heavenly abode of Vaikuṇṭha, in the
presence of his consort Śrī. At the same time,
we can conceptualize Nārāyaṇa as vibhū,
pervasive within all that exists as the ground
of being. In this way, Nārāyaṇa becomes a
person who is somewhere (Nārāyaṇa in
Vaikuṇṭha) and a substance that is
everywhere (jñāna, or wisdom, as the
underlying substrate of reality). In this way,
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Rāmānuja unites the strengths of theism and
transtheism in one personal, omnipresent
deity.30
Objection: An omnipresent body would
displace all other bodies.

How can the principle be maintained, that
God permeates and fills all things, as
Scripture says, “Do not I fill Heaven and
Earth, saith the Lord?” [Jeremiah 23.24].
For it is impossible to permeate and be
permeated by others without dividing and
being divided, without being blended and
contrasted, just as when a number of
liquids are mixed together and blended.
(St. John of Damascus)31

Two bodies cannot occupy the same space.
They displace one another. That’s why billiard
balls move other billiard balls and couples
sharing a bed fight for territory. If God is
omnipresent and has a body, then God would
displace all other bodies. Quite simply, no
other bodies could exist besides God’s.
Therefore, God cannot have a body.32

Rāmānuja replies: The Śrīvaiṣṇava doctrine of
dreaming creation resolves the contest
between bodies.
Rāmānuja’s tradition provides a visual
reconciliation of the divine embodiedness and
omnipresence, in the figure of Viṣṇu dreaming
the universe into being. To this image of Viṣṇu
Rāmānuja dedicates his Vedārthasaṅgraha: “I
offer adoration to Vishnu, the all-pervading
Supreme Being, who is the overlord of all
sentient and non-sentient entities, who
reposes on the primordial Shesa, who is pure
and infinite and in whom abound blissful
perfections.”33 In this image, Viṣṇu is in
Vaikuṇṭha where he reclines on the cosmic
serpent Śeṣa, generating our own universe by
the power of his imaginative dreaming. But
Viṣṇu’s dreaming is not like our dreaming—it
is free, aware, and purposeful, directed by
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Viṣṇu. It is the means of Viṣṇu’s creation, not
an accident of his subconscious. As the
occupants of Viṣṇu’s magic, we occupy the
mind of God, which pervades our universe
even as Viṣṇu resides locally in heaven.
Our own experience of dreaming
illustrates
the
spatial
elasticity
of
embodiment. When we dream, our dreaming
body is somewhere. But in our dream, our
dreamed body is somewhere else. We are two
places at once, as both dreamer and dreamed.
All the other bodies in our dream exist,
alongside our dreamed body, in spatial
relation to our dreamed body, within our
dreaming mind. That is, they are spatially
related to one another in the dream, but not
spatially related to the dreaming mind, being
unaware of their invisible sustainer. God, like
any dreamer, can be embodied and pervade
bodies, just as we are embodied and our mind
pervades the bodies within our dream.

Figure 1: Viṣṇu Dreaming (Credit: Wikicommons)

Objection: Embodiment limits to a place,
hence limits our knowledge to a
perspective.

Intellectual knowledge, moreover, is more
certain than sensitive knowledge. In
nature we find an object for the sense and
therefore for the intellect as well. But the
order and distinction of powers is
according to the order of objects.
Therefore, above all sensible things there
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is something intelligible among things.
Now, every body having actual existence
is sensible. Therefore, we can find
something nobler above all bodies. Hence,
if God is a body, He will not be the first and
greatest being. (St. Thomas Aquinas)34

Aquinas argues that if God is embodied,
then God would be something that we know
sensibly rather than intellectually. But
sensible knowledge changes; it can be
distorted by perspective, lost to memory,
influenced
by
prejudice.
Intellectual
knowledge, such as mathematical truth, is
higher, purer, more universal, and more
reliable than sensible knowledge. Hence, God
must be something or someone we know
intellectually; God must be disembodied like
mathematics, not embodied like a landscape
(Aquinas, §20, 6).
Rāmānuja is not working within Aquinas’
Platonic hierarchy of being. As we saw above
in our section on the cosmic embodiment of
Nārāyaṇa, for Rāmānuja both material nature
and intellectual truth are fully divine, since
both are solely from God. One cannot be
ranked over the other, as God cannot be
ranked over God (Rāmānuja, §12, 15). For this
reason, sensible experience is as true and real
as intellectual experience. Both sensibility and
intellectuality are gifts of God, sustained by
God, and to be trusted—like God.
Related to the objection from locality, the
possession of a body suggests limitation to a
perspective. If we depend on our senses for
knowledge, then our knowledge will be local.
But if we rely on our intellect for knowledge,
then our knowledge will be universal. Classical
theism defines God as omniscient, knowing all
things from everywhere. Since embodied
beings can only know some things from
somewhere, God cannot be embodied. In other
words, God’s knowing cannot be limited,
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subjective, and situated. It must
transcendent, objective, and universal.35

be

Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa is an embodied
person who knows, but Nārāyaṇa is also
knowledge itself.
The
proper
form
(svarūpa)
of
Brahman/Nārāyaṇa, consisting of infinite,
pure, blissful knowledge, is not an abstraction
that one can solely meditate upon, nor is it a
mode of being with which one attempts to
achieve identity. In other words, it is not the
nirguṇa Brahman of monistic Advaita.36 In the
end, perfectly blissful knowledge is the proper
form of Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Person
(Puruṣotamma) and the sole object of
Śrīvaiṣṇava devotion.37 Of the svarūpa’s
attributes, two are defining: knowledge in the
form of bliss (ānandarūpajñānam), and
opposition to all impurity (malapratyanīka).
These defining attributes (dharmas) are
fundamental to all auspicious attributes
(kalyāṇaguṇas). Indeed, dharma suggests
establishing or supporting,38 implying that the
defining attributes serve as a ground for the
auspicious attributes. Nevertheless, even
these defining attributes are but attributes
(guṇas). They characterize the proper form of
Brahman, but are not that proper form
(svarūpa).39 Nārāyaṇa, then, presents with
form and without form, and offers all the
benefits of Personalist devotion as well as
Idealist meditation. According to Rāmānuja,
we don’t have to choose. Nārāyaṇa is an ocean
of auspicious attributes, even those that our
limited logic might define as opposing.
Objection: Embodiment subordinates God
to time.

Our God did not begin to be in time: He
alone is without beginning, and He is the
beginning of all things. God is a Spirit, not
pervading matter, but the Maker of
material spirits; and of the forms that are
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in matter; He is invisible, impalpable,
being Himself the Father of both sensible
and invisible things. (Tatian the Syrian)40

Divine embodiment suggests temporality
rather than eternality, timefulness instead of
timelessness. As noted above, for classical
Christian theologians, God’s perfection—God’s
perfect actuality, devoid of any potentiality—
precludes change. But a body that does not
change, a body outside of time, would be a
statue, and a lifeless statue cannot symbolize a
living God. The ascription of timelessness to
God necessitates the disembodiment of God, or
else God becomes frozen.41 (The liberal
theological trajectory within which we are
speculating is much less suspicious of divine
participation in time and/or divine change.
Nevertheless, we include this objection and
response for the sake of thoroughness.)
Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa is not subject to
time as we know it.
For Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa as embodied is
also Nārāyaṇa as eternal, transcending our
entropic
temporality.
Hence,
divine
embodiment, and its connotation of change
through relation, need not limit God to time as
we know it. Rāmānuja explicitly states that
Nārāyaṇa is beyond the changes (pariṇāma)
that occur within time (kāla).42 More
explicitly, time is dependent upon Nārāyaṇa
for its existence, as is all that exists that is not
Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, he is not under the
dominion of time. Rather, time is under the
dominion of Nārāyaṇa.43 Nārāyaṇa, who is
perfectly free of all impurity, does not know
decay, or karma, or vice, or suffering, or any of
the other negative qualities that pervade our
temporal universe.
Since Nārāyaṇa is beyond the changes
(pariṇāma) inherent in time, Nārāyaṇa is also
beyond the cause and effect experienced
within saṃsāra. So, he is not subject to the
reciprocal interactions of everyday existence.

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol31/iss1/19
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1696

Instead, he grounds that cause and effect as
the substantial and efficient cause of all that is.
He is both the marble and the sculptor, as it
were. For this reason, Nārāyaṇa is denoted as
the śeṣa (Preserver, Sustainer, Principal) of the
śeṣin (Preserved, Sustained, Accessory), or the
prakārin (mode-possessor) of the prakāra
(mode).
Objection: The incarnation of God in
Christ renders Godhead embodiment
redundant.

The Lord did not come to make a display.
He came to heal and to teach suffering
men. For one who wanted to make a
display the thing would have been just to
appear and dazzle the beholders. But for
Him Who came to heal and to teach the
way was not merely to dwell here, but to
put Himself at the disposal of those who
needed Him, and to be manifested
according as they could bear it.

(Athanasius of Alexandria)44
The Christian tradition asserts the
embodiment of God in Jesus of Nazareth. This
divine embodiment ratifies creation as the
good handiwork of the Creator. Materiality
and temporality are the twin blessings of our
divinely intended life, a life that God
celebrates through participation. Because
Christian theology already asserts the divine
embodiment in Jesus Christ, we need not
assert embodiment within the Godhead itself.
Such an assertion provides no added value and
creates unnecessary theological problems.
Rāmānuja replies: This-worldly incarnation
and heavenly incarnation are both necessary.
Rāmānuja powerfully addresses the above
criticism by drawing clear distinctions
between human and divine embodiment in
relation to time. As noted above, the divine
form (divyarūpa) is not subject to the
vicissitudes of time (kāla or muhūrta).45 Time,
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conceptualized as a substance devoid of guṇas
(qualities) and coordinate with prakṛti,46 does
not affect Nārāyaṇa who, even as form, is
unchanging.47 Because Nārāyaṇa is beyond the
influence of time, Nārāyaṇa’s divine form is
eternal. That is, Nārāyaṇa does not
temporarily assume form within time for the
benefit of worshippers, nor is Nārāyaṇa’s form
a mere illusion created for their devotional
meditations.
Instead,
any
temporal
manifestation of Nārāyaṇa is a manifestation
of the real, eternal form of Nārāyaṇa.48 The
divine form may be individualized specifically
for the meditative benefit of devotees, but that
individualization remains a projection of the
real, eternal form that exists prior to any
devotional need.49
The form that Nārāyaṇa assumes
explicitly for the benefit of the world is the
form of the avatāra (descent), earthly
manifestations of Viṣṇu that increase his
accessibility to earthly devotees and restore
the earthly dharma.50 But the avatāra is not
the divine form per se. It is instead a temporal
descent of the eternal divine form for
expressly temporal purposes. The divine form
itself remains in Vaikuṇṭha, the heavenly
abode, transcendent of entropic, prakṛtic time
as we know it.
Objection:
Assertion
embodiment
reduces
materiality.

of
divine
divinity
to

Matter is in potentiality. But we have
shown (I: 2:3) that God is pure act, without
any potentiality. Hence it is impossible
that God should be composed of matter
and form. (St. Thomas Aquinas)51

In the classical world, Greco-Roman
Idealism—Platonism, Plotinianism, Stoicism,
etc.—rejected anthropomorphic gods and
their accompanying imagery as illiterate
superstition. Fearing that material gods
produced materialistic worshipers, they
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substituted such abstract concepts as the
Good, the One, or the Logos for the personal
gods of the masses.52 Articulating Christian
faith within Hellenistic culture, Christian
intellectual elites frequently endorsed
iconoclasm (the rejection of divine imagery),
even while the popular tradition remained
iconodulic (enthusiastically utilizing divine
imagery). The elites suspected that
embodiment connoted entanglement with
matter. God, as the perfectly actual creator of
matter and the natural laws that govern it,
could not be limited by or subject to His own
potential-laden creation. God must be spirit.
Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa’s body is not
constituted by the same matter that
constitutes us.
Nārāyaṇa’s divine form is aprakṛtic, or
free of any taint by that profane psychokarmic
complex that Śrīvaiṣṇavas call prakṛti. While
it has an appearance, it is supersensory and
visible only to the inner eye of the mind.53 This
is a body, but it is not a material body. Here,
Rāmānuja is influenced by Muṇḍāka Upaniṣad
3.1.8, which he quotes in part and we supply in
whole:
Not by sight, not by speech, nor by any
other sense;
nor by austerities or rites is he
grasped.
Rather the partless one is seen by a man,
as he meditates,
when his being has become pure,
through the lucidity of knowledge.54
We must note that just as Nārāyaṇa’s body is
aprakṛtic it is also free from karma and
voluntarily chosen. Jīvas (individual souls), on
the other hand, involuntarily receive bodies
(human or otherwise) appropriate to their
karmic destiny. They then live out their lives
within that body subject to the bonds of karma
and bound to the pleasures and pains of
saṃsāric existence. So, Nārāyaṇa’s aprakṛtic
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body is necessarily an akarmic body. Nārāyaṇa
is embodied because he is omnipotent and has
chosen to become embodied.55
Nārāyaṇa’s
omnipotence;
Nārāyaṇa’s
transcendence.
While reconciling Nārāyaṇa’s role as both
material and efficient cause of the universe,
Rāmānuja notes that reason cannot restrict
the power of God. By mundane standards,
material and efficient causality are mutually
exclusive—the marble does not carve itself
into a statue. But by divine standards material
and efficient causality are reconcilable within
one entity. Indeed, Nārāyaṇa unites material
and efficient causality through the divine
omnipotence
(sarvaśakti)—creating,
sustaining, and forming the universe and all
beings within it.56
Throughout Rāmānuja’s arguments above
is an underlying conviction that exclusivist
logic does not bind Nārāyaṇa. We humans
cannot be here and there, located body and
omnipresent spirit, but Nārāyaṇa can. For
Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa is so exalted that the
accusation of divine contradiction is
incomprehensible. Rational law, created and
sustained by Nārāyaṇa, cannot restrict the
overflowing grace of Nārāyaṇa, who chooses
to be both embodied and omnipresent, for us.
By way of consequence, we should dismiss the
charge of divine contradiction as a human
attempt to limit the divine freedom.
God is equally embodied and formless,
accessible and transcendent. That is,
according to Rāmānuja as he interprets
Śrīvaiṣṇava scripture, God is characterized by
both form (a located aspect that is somewhere)
and formlessness (an omnipresent aspect that
is everywhere). Yet, neither of these aspects is
subordinate or ancillary to the other. Rather,
they are equally real, equally legitimate, and
equally proper to Nārāyaṇa. In fact, when
introducing the divine, embodied form
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(divyarūpa) in relationship to the divine
formlessness (svarūpa), Rāmānuja states that
it is tadvad eva, or “just like that”. Rāmānuja
then goes on to state that “this divine form is
of Brahman’s essential way of being”
[divyarūpam api svabhāvikam asti]. In other
words, Nārāyaṇa with form is not penultimate
to Nārāyaṇa without form; they are two
manifestations of one, ultimate unity.57
Nārāyaṇa’s beauty attracts, while
Nārāyaṇa’s pure, blissful knowledge provides
a goal of human spiritual becoming.
Nārāyaṇa’s personality begets love, while
Nārāyaṇa’s svarūpa engenders meditation.
The devotee thus seeks both the transcendent
(insofar as Nārāyaṇa retains a humanlike form
in Vaikuṇṭha), and the immanent (insofar as
Nārāyaṇa’s pure, blissful jñāna (wisdom)
remains the infinite ground of the finite jīva’s
[individual soul’s] being). Through worshiping
Nārāyaṇa who is in Vaikuṇṭha, the devotee
become paradoxically aware of the
omnipresence of divinity. Through reception
of Nārāyaṇa’s grace, the devotee is purified
into his or her true self. According to
Rāmānuja, for the devotees of Nārāyaṇa the
transcendent is immanent, ecstasis is enstasis,
love is wisdom, and beauty is bliss. There is no
longer any need to choose between devotion
and meditation. All has been reconciled in the
divine person, Nārāyaṇa, who offers all
manner of salvation.
Godhead embodiment and the Christian
tradition: A metaphor too far?
Proposing the embodiment of God, unto
the Godhead, may draw criticism as an
excessive
anthropomorphism.
Some
theologians, insisting that God is wholly other,
might complain that embodiment risks too
much and brings God too low. Ideally,
theological metaphors point to a reality they
cannot reach. The metaphors of personhood,
vulnerability, and participation may suggest
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an involved God, but do not necessitate
embodiment. Instead, our critics might argue,
the concept of embodiment unnecessarily
lowers God into our analogies, reducing the
divine to human comprehension and
eradicating any sense of mystery.
For these reasons, the Christian
theological tradition has generally rejected
Godhead embodiment. However, in the
thought of Rāmānuja we find a highly
sophisticated theology that enthusiastically
endorses embodiment. Indeed, Rāmānuja
anticipates and responds to Christian
theological (not biblical) arguments against
embodiment. The rationality of his theology
challenges these Christian arguments, even as
they derive from the sources and methods of
the Hindu Vedānta tradition. Given
Rāmānuja’s success in addressing theological
arguments against embodiment, constructive
theologians must evaluate embodiment on
axiological, not ontological, grounds. In other
words, we must consider the consequences of
the doctrine, its resonance with felt human
existence, how it would play out in
communitarian life, the ethics it would
commend, and the future it would hope for.
Below, I will argue (speculatively) for Godhead
embodiment in the Christian tradition. These
arguments will utilize and adapt the theology
of Rāmānuja for the Christian tradition.
Embodiment fulfills the tripersonal Godhead.
Recent doctrines of divine vulnerability,
affectivity, relationality, and mutability beg
completion through divine embodiment.
Embodiment dovetails with personality. In the
Latin etymology of the word “person,” a
“person” was a dramatic mask, that which an
actor would “sound through” (personare). The
mask was a concrete expression of the
character’s abstract values, dispositions, and
habits—of their personality. Personality
suggests relatedness, and relatedness suggests
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embodiment. Certainly, God’s embodiment
differs from our embodiment. Nevertheless, to
be truly distinct, to truly experience increasethrough-relation, the divine persons would
benefit from bodies through which their
selves sound. If the Trinitarian Godhead is a
tripersonal community of joy, then it requires
differentiated centers of identity through
which that joy can flow. It requires bodies,
because bodies facilitate locatedness and
difference, everything that makes relatedness
meaningful.
Idealism is not more sophisticated than
personalism.
In the history of religious interactions,
Idealist religions frequently condescend to
Personalist religions. In the West, for example,
contemplative Platonism, Plotinianism, and
Stoicism looked down on popular theism.
Likewise, Rāmānuja’s primary opponents were
the transtheistic, meditative Advaitins, who
prioritized nirguṇa (attributeless) Brahman
over saguṇa (attributed) Brahman. Indeed,
Rāmānuja’s theological vocation was to
inspire devotional, Śrīvaiṣṇava Tamils as they
confronted meditative, Advaitin elitism.
A powerful Advaitin condemnation of
devotional theology may be found in Śaṅkara’s
commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad:
He, one who is not a knower of Brahman,
who worships another god, a god different
from himself, approaches him in a
subordinate position, offering him praises,
salutations, sacrifices, presents, devotion,
meditation, etc., thinking, “He is one, nonself, different from me, and I am another,
qualified for rites, and I must serve him
like a debtor”—worships him with such
ideas, does not know the truth. He, this
ignorant man, has not only the evil of
ignorance, but is also like an animal to the
gods. As a cow or other animals are
utilized through their services such as
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carrying loads or yielding milk, so is this
man of use to every one of the gods and
others on account of his many services
such as the performance of sacrifices. That
is to say, he is therefore engaged to do all
kinds of services for them.58
Śaṅkara then goes on to assert that these gods,
being pleased by the service of their devotees,
would not want the devotees to achieve mokṣa
(realization, release), since this release would
end the devotees’ service toward the gods. Just
as a human becomes distressed at losing a
valued animal, so the gods become distressed
at losing a valued servant. Therefore, the gods
attempt to keep many humans in bondage by
convincing them of the difference between
gods and humans when in fact, all that is, is
Brahman.
Advancing his own theistic Śrīvaiṣṇavism,
Rāmānuja counters the Advaitins by insisting
that Brahman as Nārāyaṇa (the personal name
of God) is an ocean of auspicious attributes
even as his proper form is pure, blissful
knowledge. In this way Rāmānuja reconciles
Tamil devotionalism with the Upaniṣadic
emphasis on the ultimacy of wisdom (jñāna).
But in achieving this reconciliation, Rāmānuja
makes the weighty decision to emphasize
Nārāyaṇa’s differentiation over against his
unity. This emphasis establishes as real and
ultimate all attributes associated with
Nārāyaṇa, including those more closely
associated with the embodied, highly personal
divine form (divyarūpa).
Pastoral benefits of the both/and God.
Rāmānuja’s reconciliation of divine
transcendence and divine embodiment has
important ecclesiastical implications. By
adopting and adapting Rāmānuja’s theology,
Christians can marry personal attributes to
transcendent attributes in a seamless
synthesis who is intimately accessible yet
utterly majestic. And this marriage need not
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be forced—form and formlessness are not
competing aspects of the divine person; they
are complementary qualities that manifest
God’s superabundance. Biblically, based on the
doctrine of imago dei in Genesis One,
Christians can propose divine embodiment,
confident that they are not projecting human
identity onto God, but respecting God’s own
gracious creation of humankind in the divine,
personal image. Rāmānuja’s triumph can
inspire Christians, empowering them to
celebrate the human situation through the
doctrine of Godhead embodiment.
In the end, the most important fact
regarding the svarūpa and divyarūpa of
Nārāyaṇa is the simultaneous existence of
each within Rāmānuja’s Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition.
His ascription of two distinct manifestations
to one ultimate Nārāyaṇa grants the tradition
both spiritual comprehensiveness and cultic
elasticity. With regard to spiritual
comprehensiveness, in Nārāyaṇa the
Śrīvaiṣṇava devotee finds the Infinite Absolute
of Upaniṣadic meditation married to the
personal God of Śrīvaiṣṇava devotionalism.
With regard to cultic elasticity, the
Śrīvaiṣṇavas are now justified in practicing
both the ecstatic, relational worship of their
own saints (the Alvars), as well as the enstatic,
nondual meditation suggested by the early
Upaniṣads. In other words, the divyarūpa and
svarūpa of Nārāyaṇa represent a synthesis of
traditions generally considered exclusive,
creating a spacious tradition within which
different religious personalities could find a
home.
Christians
considering
Godhead
embodiment should experience the idea as
opportunity, not threat. We all of us are
embodied souls or ensouled bodies. We are
both qualified (bearing difference, viśiṣṭa) and
nondual (perfectly unified, advaita). We are
viśiṣṭādvaita, synthesizing spirit and matter
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into diversified, unified experience. To
privilege spirit over matter or matter over
spirit rejects the interwoven, inseparable
nature of reality as God intended it. Out of
love, God has joined our souls to bodies, so that
spirit might experience differentiation and
perspective.
This
differentiation
and
perspective grants uniqueness to each
member of the community, allowing them to
make a singular contribution, rendering their
uniqueness
vital.
Collectively,
each
individual’s difference helps the group. By
opening ourselves up to the vision of all
members, we can achieve a dynamic interplay
of viewpoints that quickens our knowing. We
can know more as individuals uniting than we
ever could as individuals separated, or even as
one universal mind. To paraphrase Paul, we
can know more as an ecclesia (1 Corinthians
12:12-20).
We should not separate what God has
joined. God invites us to celebrate our dual

nature as perfectly unified, or nondual. Yet, if
embodiment is a blessing, then embodiment
may not only be from God; it may also be of
God. Since embodiment and transcendence
are not logically exclusive, we can have both
and the synergistic concept of God that they
offer. Rāmānuja has shown that reason does
not demand the disembodiment of God, and
that embodiment does not lower God into the
limits of our metaphorical language. Hence,
our decision to accept divine embodiment or
not is an axiological decision, not an
ontological decision. It is plausible, but is it
good? According to Rāmānuja, divine
embodiment is salvific. If he is right, then our
acceptance of divine embodiment will help us
to celebrate our own embodiment, and the
rich relation to God, others, and the cosmos
that this embodiment allows.
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